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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND ARMS CONTROL
POLICY IN THE EARLY 1980's
ROBERT T. GREY, JR.*
INTRODUCTION

From the first explosion of an atomic device in 1945 until today,
mankind has grappled with the problem of the role of nuclear weapons.
When the United States alone possessed atomic power, some held the
hope that it was not too late to close the lid of Pandora's box, locking
the genie of atomic power inside forever. Others believed that man had
consciously begun the nuclear age and now had to live with its consequences.' The United States would be foolish, and indeed would place
itself in danger, if atomic weapons were not added to its arsenal. When
the Soviet Union exploded its own atomic device in 1949, however,
many of these arguments became moot. It was then obvious -that the
atomic weapon had become a principal piece on the cold war chessboard; the nuclear age with all its terror was here to stay. What remained to be decided by national leaders was how to fashion a national
security policy around this weapon and, ultimately, how to prevent its
use. Thus was born a legacy that would transcend partisan domestic
politics and would be passed on from one presidential administration
to the next-the formulation of United States nuclear weapons and
arms control policy.
When Ronald Reagan was inaugurated President on January 20,
1981, he received this legacy. This essay will describe the evolution of
the current United States strategic doctrine and the place of Reagan
administration arms control policy within that framework.
DETERRENCE

The most fundamental objective of United States strategic policy
since 1945 has been to prevent direct attack, particularly nuclear attack, on the United States, our friends and our allies. For an adversary
to be deterred from actions harmful to United States national interests, it must realize clearly that the United States possesses sufficient
*
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military force, and has the will and ability to use that force, either to
make the adversary's objectives unattainable or prohibitively costly, or
both. The threat of such a retaliatory blow by the United States must
be credible in all possible crisis situations. If the United States has
such a deterrent, and an adversary believes that such force could damage it to an unacceptable extent should it attempt aggression, then its
actions would, theoretically, be forestalled. The United States has used
its nuclear strategy for most of the post-war era as a deterrent against
large-scale Soviet nuclear strikes.2 The implicit threat that aggression
on a smaller scale could escalate into a full-scale nuclear exchange has
also served this purpose. On the whole, however, it has been recognized
over the last thirty years that nuclear capabilities alone could prevent
only a narrow range of aggressive actions.
For a policy of deterrence to succeed, our adversaries must believe
in the viability of our nuclear force. Each post-World War II administration has faced this challenge as rapid advances in weapons technology threatened to undermine the longevity of its strategic forces and,
thus, of their deterrent value. Keeping the military force component of
our nuclear deterrent modern and effective in order to ensure credibility has been costly and never-ending,' particularly in light of the Soviet Union's explosion of its atomic device in 19494 and its dramatic
advances in ballistic missile technology in the late 1950's.5 Thus, the
major problem facing strategic planners has been to ensure a survivable and enduring retaliatory second-strike capability that has the
ability to inflict unacceptable damage on an aggressor. Many solutions
to this problem have been reached over the past thirty-seven years.
The most durable solutions have involved increasing bomber numbers
and readiness, hardening ICBM silos, enhancing command, control and
communications, targeting Soviet military facilities and, most importantly, basing our nuclear deterrent on a triad of ICBMs, submarinelaunched ballistic missiles and strategic bombers. Nevertheless, the
continuing threat to the survivability and credibility of our diverse deterrent force requires new programs to upgrade and modernize our
strategic forces.
In addition to modernizing our strategic nuclear forces, we must
convince our adversaries that we have a credible plan for the use of our
See S. ZUCKERMAN, NUCLEAR ILLUSION AND REALITY 42-44 (1982).
3. See Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year
1983: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Armed Services, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 7-11
2.

(1982) (statement of Caspar W. Weinberger, Secretary of Defense).
4. See THE HARVARD NUCLEAR STUDY GROUP, LIVING WITH NUCLEAR
(1983) [hereinafter cited as HARVARD STUDY GROUP].

5. See id. at 82-83.
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retaliatory forces and the will to implement this plan. As momentum
has shifted from United States monopoly and overwhelming superiority during the 1940's and 1950's, to a balance between the United
States and the Soviet Union during the 1970's and, finally, to the present Soviet superiority, strategic doctrine has been adapted to meet
these new realities.
THE EVOLUTION OF THE UNITED STATES STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DOCTRINE

Prior to the Kennedy administration, the United States nuclear
deterrent policy was based on an overwhelming United States nuclear
superiority.' Although the Soviet Union had exploded a thermonuclear
weapon and was beginning to develop more sophisticated and successful means of delivering that weapon to peripheral and United States
targets, the threat to the survivability of the United States deterrent
force was minimal. The Eisenhower administration placed great emphasis on nuclear weapons in order to avert a full range of possible
threats, both nuclear and non-nuclear. The Eisenhower administration
was concerned with reducing defense spending and used United States
nuclear superiority as a substitute for large conventional forces in
preventing aggression. 7 Secretary of State John Foster Dulles made explicit the Administration's emphasis on nuclear deterrence as an allpurpose preventative measure when he warned of the United States
determination to respond with appropriate means and at appropriate
places should Soviet actions warrant a response.'
The viability of the United States strategic forces, the concept
upon which this doctrine was based, remained unthreatened until the
Soviets increased their long-range bomber force and began to make
surprising strides in ballistic missile development. During 1957 the Soviets launched the first ICBM and, a few months later, Sputnik. The
United States was therefore forced to adjust its nuclear doctrine as a
result of the Soviet erosion of the United States absolute nuclear
superiority. 9
In 1961 President Kennedy inherited a strategic doctrine that did
not reflect the new strategic situation. The United States threat of responding with nuclear weapons to any Soviet aggression was no longer
believable in light of the ability of the Soviets to inflict unacceptable
damage upon the United States. Furthermore, the threat of using nu6.
7.
8.
80.
9.

See id. at 78-80.
See id. at 80.
See S. ZUCKERMAN, supra note 2, at 43; HARVARD STUDY GROUP, supra note 4, at
See generally H. KISSINGER, NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND FOREIGN POLICY 10-20 (1957).
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clear weapons was not a fully credible response to smaller, non-nuclear
conflicts. The view that any war with the Soviet Union would degenerate into a general war was seen as a major policy flaw. By following this
policy, a President might be given no option other than suicide or surrender in responding to Soviet aggression. To avoid having to make
this choice, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara proposed a more
flexible strategic doctrine that would provide the President with a
fuller range of strategic nuclear options. He sought to develop a range
of response options which would limit damage by attacking only Soviet
military targets. McNamara also sought to strengthen conventional
forces so that the President would have non-nuclear options available.1 0 The principal United States strategic doctrine, however, remained deterrence by the threat of a full-scale nuclear response.
After 1962, the emphasis placed on developing a more flexible
strategic policy was lessened, and this policy was replaced by the doctrine of "Mutual Assured Destruction."1 " As a policy, Mutual Assured
Destruction involved the use of massive retaliation against urban-industrial targets as a deterrent. McNamara tried to establish a damage
criterion for Mutual Assured Destruction so that the United States
could statistically determine the level of strategic nuclear firepower
necessary to discourage Soviet aggression. He concluded that if twenty
to twenty-five percent of the Soviet population and fifty percent of its
industrial capacity could be destroyed by United States retaliatory
strikes, then that level of nuclear force was a sufficient deterrent." As
the then existing level of forces met this criterion, the United States
halted additional construction on its strategic systems. At the same
time that Congress and the armed services were pressing for additional
forces, the Soviet Union embarked on the massive program of strategic
and conventional arms development which has continued until today.
McNamara often spoke publicly of the need for nuclear flexibility
in order to respond to contingencies across the nuclear spectrum." Although rejecting massive retaliation in favor of a flexible response, his
approach depended ultimately upon the threat of inflicting large-scale
civil destruction on the Soviets in order to deter. McNamara tried for
seven years to implement his policy of flexible response, but the only
additional targeting choices he was able to implement were several
large-scale, pre-planned options that singled out military targets for
10. See

HARVARD STUDY GROUP,

supra note 4, at 85.

11. See id. at 88-89.
12. See T. ETZOLD, DEFENSE OR DELUsION? 154 (stating that these figures were subsequently revised to 25% and 70% respectively).
13. See HARVARD STUDY GROUP, supra note 4, at 83-85.
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Mutual Assured Destruction would remain for many

years the only major nuclear option for a United States President in a
confrontation with Soviet nuclear aggression.
THE

1970's

In the decade after 1970, both the United States and the Soviet
Union recognized that they were approaching a state of parity in strategic nuclear weapons. Upon reaching parity, the Soviets continued to
build additional systems until they were stopped by the numerical limits in the SALT I accords. 5 They then turned to making qualitative
improvements. The United States response to the Soviet buildup program, especially their anti-ballistic missile (ABM) program, had been
to match qualitatively Soviet numerical advantages by increasing the
firepower of United States missile forces through the development of
multiple, independently targetable, reentry vehicles (MIRVs).' A major advantage enjoyed by the Soviets, however, was the larger size of
the ICBMs.The Soviet heavy missiles could deliver a larger payload
than those of the United States which, coupled with the subsequent
Soviet development of MIRVs and the improved accuracy of its
MIRVed warheads, could pose a formidable threat to the technological
survival of the United States ICBM force in the 1980's.
In the early 1970's, the United States lead in technology, both in
guidance systems and MIRVs, seemed to offset the Soviet lead in numbers and throw-weight.17 This was seen as providing a breathing space
for the United States in which to speed up development of a new generation of strategic systems. It was hoped that this would maintain deterrence in the latter part of the 1980's when the Soviets would be able
to exploit their heavy missile advantage in order to swing the strategic
balance in their favor. Thus, work intensified on the B-1 bomber, the

14. See id. at 84.
15. Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, May 26, 1972, United
States-U.S.S.R., 23 U.S.T. 3435, T.I.A.S. No. 7503 [hereinafter cited as ABM Treaty];
Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, May 26, 1972, United States-U.S.S.R., 23 U.S.T. 3462, T.I.A.S. No. 7504
[hereinafter cited as Interim Agreement].
The Interim Agreement included a Protocol which set a maximum on land-based
intercontinental and submarine ballistic missile launchers (ICBMs and SLBMs, respectively). Id.
The ABM Treaty was modified by a Protocol. See Protocol to the Treaty on the
Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, July 3, 1974, United States-U.S.S.R., 27
U.S.T. 1645, T.I.A.S. No. 8376.
16. See HARVARD STUDY GRoup, supra note 4, at 90.
17. Id. at 90-91.
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Trident missile and the submarine program during the Nixon
administration.
Arms control also began to play a major role in United States national security policy in the 1970's. In May 1972, the Interim Agreement (IA)" s and the ABM Treaty 9 were signed, placing limits and re9traints on the nuclear arsenal of each signatory. The signing of the
SALT I agreements was possible because both sides thought they were
at parity and that it was in their national interest to limit further
growth of nuclear weapons. The ABM Treaty helped to avert a possible offensive arms race,"0 while the IA froze the number of strategic
ballistic missile launchers on each side.2 1 The IA successfully capped
the rapid growth in the number of Soviet launchers and laid the
groundwork for future proposals dealing with a reduction in those
launchers.22 Unfortunately, the IA also codified the Soviet advantage in
heavy missiles, and it was impossible in later negotiations to make reductions in these most destabilizing of systems. This was one of the
major flaws in the SALT II Treaty 2 signed in 1979. It continued to
allow the asymmetry in heavy missiles to exist. In addition, the SALT
II Treaty included provisions that would have permitted large increases in the number of nuclear weapons.2 '
Thus, the arms control efforts of the 1970's failed to produce lower
force levels or reduce the threat to our ICBMs posed by Soviet heavy
18. Interim Agreement, supra note 15.
19. ABM Treaty, supra note 15.
20. See HARVARD STUDY GROUP, supra note 4, at 92-94. The ABM Treaty limited the
United States and the Soviet Union each to one ABM deployment area, 100 ABM
launchers and 100 ABM interceptor missiles at launch sites. Id. In addition, it allowed
for six ABM radar complexes at each nation's capital or 20 ABM radars at an ICBM
field. Id.
21. The Interim Agreement set a ceiling on ICBMs and SLBMs at their 1972 levels.
Interim Agreement, supra note 15, art. 1. At that time, the United States had 656 SLBM
launchers and the U.S.S.R. had 740. Additional SLBM launchers were permitted as
replacements for older ICBM launchers. The United States was permitted a maximum of
710 SLBM launchers on 44 submarines and the U.S.S.R., a maximum of 950 SLBM
launchers on 62 submarines. Id.
22. See HARVARD STUDY GROUP, supra note 4, at 92-93.
23. SALT II, signed June 18, 1979 (not entered into force), reprinted in S. EXEC.
Doc. No. Y, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 37-45; see also BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPT.
OF STATE, SELECTED DOCUMENTS No. 12B, SALT II Agreement (June 18, 1979).
24. SALT II allowed, inter alia, for further weapons production subject to certain
numerical ceilings. These included: 2,250 ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, heavy
bombers and long-range ASBMs (i.e. air-to-surface ballistic missiles with ranges greater
than 600 kilometers); 1,320 launchers for MIRVed ICBMs, launchers for MIRVed
SLBMs, MIRVed ASBMs, and heavy bombers equipped with long-range cruise missiles;
1,200 launchers for MIRVed ICBMs, launchers for MIRVed SLBMs, and MIRVed
ASBMs; and 820 launchers for MIRVed ICBMs. Id.
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missiles. All through the 1970's, as United States strategic modernization programs were cancelled or delayed, the Soviets continued to
modernize and increase their warhead numbers, despite the continuing
process of arms control negotiations.
Richard Nixon, like John F. Kennedy, took issue with the lack of
available nuclear options, especially in light of the approaching parity
with the Soviet Union. He, too, was disturbed at the idea that in the
event of a nuclear attack, a President would be left with the single
option of ordering mass destruction of enemy civilians, with a similar
attack on the United States sure to follow.2 5
Nixon's Secretary of Defense, James Schlesinger, echoing Secretary McNamara before him, answered the President's concerns by suggesting the need for a series of measured responses to aggression; implying the idea of limited nuclear war. 26 Unlike McNamara, however,
Schlesinger was able to go further in implementing proposals for a controlled, flexible response. Under the name "strategic sufficiency," a
strategic doctrine was formulated to provide a wider range of response
options by identifying various targets and grouping them into operational plans which could be more responsive to a range of possible
challenges. Strategic planning targeted military as well as civilian
targets, giving the President the theoretical capability to use forces for
objectives other than the mass extermination of population.2 1 Schlesinger believed that with a reserve capability for threatening urban-industrial targets, with increasingly flexible offensive systems and with
improvements in sensors, surveillance and command-control, response
options causing far less civilian damage could be implemented. 28 The
philosophy of flexible response was slowly being implemented with the
doctrine of strategic sufficiency.
By the time the Carter administration took office in 1977, the strategic balance was regarded as being in a state of "essential equivalence. ' 26 This was interpreted by the Carter administration as meaning
25. See R. NIXON, THE REAL WAR 176-78 (1980).
[MAD] leaves the United States with no reasonable options if deterrence should
fail, and it supports no rational political or military objectives in the event of
war. A rational deterrent cannot be based on irrational responses. What future
American President, for example, would risk New York, Philadelphia, Chicago,
and Washington to save Berlin?
Id. at 176.
26. See generally R.J. LIFTON & R. FALK, INDEFENSIBLE WEAPONS 183 (1982).
27. See generally Schlesinger, Flexible Strategic Options and Deterrence, SURVIVAL,
Mar.-Apr. 1974, at 86-90.
28. Id.
29. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, evaluating the strategic nuclear balance,
commented that
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that advantages in force characteristics enjoyed by the Soviets were
offset by other United States advantages, and vice-versa. The Soviet
advances in weapons technology foreseen in the early 1970's had now
come into being, however, and the United States strategic programs
designed to counterbalance this improved capability were bogged down
in domestic politics. The balance of forces had indeed become perilous.
In the summer of 1977, President Carter ordered a fundamental
review of United States targeting doctrine in order to examine its deterrent capability in the light of the shift in strategic balance. After
eighteen months, the review was completed, and its basic principles,
under the name "countervailing strategy," were implemented in Presidential Directive 59 (PD-59).30 PD-59 represented no fundamental
deviation from past doctrine, but instead represented a refinement and
codification of previous strategic policy statements. It tied together
and stated clearly the evolution of the strategic thinking of the past
two decades. PD-59 was designed to move nuclear strategy away from
Mutual Assured Destruction to a strategy that offered more flexible
options.
Although Secretary of Defense Harold Brown believed that Mutual Assured Destruction formed the foundation of nuclear deterrence,
he recognized its inherent limitations.3 1 He stated that "deterrence
must restrain a far wider range of threats than just massive attacks on
U.S. cities. 3' 2 After reviewing the strategic doctrine inherited by the
a rough strategic nuclear equilibrium exists between the two superpowers at the
present time. Neither country enjoys a military advantage; neither is in a position to exploit its nuclear capabilities for political ends. The situation is one of
standoff or stalemate. Mutual strategic deterrence and essential equivalence are
in effect.
S.S. KAPLAN, DIPLOMACY OF POWER 3 (1981) (quoting Department of Defense Annual
Report, Fiscal Year 1979, at 4 (1979)).
30. See generally HARVARD STUDY GROUP, supra note 4, at 95, discussing that P.D. 59
"represented a refinement and elaboration of Schlesinger's limited nuclear options idea,
giving greater stress to flexibility in targeting, the ability to change targets during the
course of a prolonged nuclear war, and the central importance of secure facilities for
command, control, communications, and intelligence." This new strategy "anticipated
prolonged nuclear battles and required more accurate missiles and beefed-up civil defense." Porro, The Policy War: Brodie vs. Kahn, BULL. OF ATOMIC SCI., June 1982, at 19.
See also Beres, PresidentialDirective 59: A CriticalAssessment, 11 PARAMETERS, J. U.S.
ARMY WAR C. 19 (1981); Grey, PresidentialDirective 59: Flawed But Useful, 11 PARAMETERS, J. U.S. ARMY WAR C. 29 (1981). Secretary of Defense Harold Brown outlined the
Carter administration's strategy in a speech he delivered to the Naval War, College. Remarks of H. Brown at the Convocation Ceremonies for the 97th Naval War College Class
(Dept. of the Navy, Aug. 20, 1980), excerpts reprinted in N.Y. Times, Aug. 21, 1980, at
A9, col. 1 [hereinafter cited as Remarks of Secretary Brown].
31. Remarks of Secretary Brown, supra note 30.
32. Id. at 6.
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Carter administration, Secretary Brown concluded that there was a
need to develop plans for attacks on Soviet military, industrial and political control targets, while holding back significant destruction capacity in reserve.13 The swift advance in Soviet weapons technology effectively ended the notion that we could maintain an adequate deterrence
solely by the threat of massive retaliation against Soviet cities. After
nineteen years and four administrations, a strategic nuclear doctrine
that embodied the flexible response essential to maintain the credibil34
ity of the nuclear deterrent was codified by a presidential directive.
CURRENT NUCLEAR AND ARMS CONTROL POLICY

When the Reagan administration came into office in January,
1981, it inherited a strategic situation in which the balance was shifting
from rough parity to Soviet supremacy. The reasons for United States
anxiety over this trend were simple. The Soviet Union had embarked
on an ambitious arms modernization program in the early 1960's. By
1968, the Soviets were approaching parity. Although at that time the
United States remained superior in numbers of warheads and in the
quality of our strategic systems, it was recognized that by the late
1970's, unless the United States modernized all three components of its
triad, the balance of forces would tilt dangerously in the Soviet favor.3 5
During the early 1970's, the United States began modernizing its
strategic triad. The MX, the Trident I missile, the Trident submarine
and missile system, the B-1 bomber and cruise missiles were intended
to meet the growing Soviet threat of the late 1970's and the 1980's.
33. Id. at 7.
34. Concluding his remarks to the Naval War College, Secretary Brown pointed out
that Presidential Directive 59 was not a new departure, adding,
Previous Administrations, going back well into the 1960's, recognized the inadequacy of a strategic docrine [sic] that would give us too narrow a range of options. The fundamental premises of our countervailing strategy are a natural
evolution of the conceptual foundations built over the course of a generation, by,
for example, Secretaries McNamara and Schlesinger, to name only two of my
predecessors who have been most identified with development of our nuclear
doctrine.
This Administration does not claim to have discovered the need for broad
scale deterrence, or for improved flexibility, or for secure and reliable command
and control of our own forces should deterrence fail, or for effective targeting of
military forces and their political leadership and military control.
This evolution in our doctrine enhances deterrence, and reduces the likelihood of nuclear war. . ..

Id.
35. See generally COMMITTEE
BER

2?

ON THE PRESENT DANGER, Is AMERICA BECOMING NUM-

CURRENT TRENDS IN THE U.S.-SOVIET MILITARY BALANCE

(1978).

N.Y.L. SCH. J.

INT'L & CoMP. L.

[Vol. 4

However, there were inadequate defense budgets to fully fund these
programs, causing United States modernization efforts to fall behind
schedule or be cancelled."6 Meanwhile, Soviet defense spending increased at the rate of approximately four percent a year overall, and
eight percent in the nuclear area.17 The credibility of the United States
deterrent was being undermined as our second-strike capability became more and more vulnerable to a Soviet first-strike.
Since the early 1970's, the Soviets have:
-developed and deployed three types of ICBMs (the SS-17, 18
and 19) with large, accurate warheads that made these ICBMs capable
of destroying most of our ICBM force;"8
-produced a highly survivable, dispersed and redundant command, control and communications (03) network that is designed specifically to withstand nuclear attack;'
-- deployed some 324 SS-20 mobile, intermediate-range, nuclear
missile launchers with 972 warheads (plus refires) which threaten
40
NATO Europe from launch sites deep within the Soviet Union;
-- expanded and improved their air defense network so that it can
increasingly hinder penetration by United States bombers; 4'
-deployed three new classes of submarine-launched ballistic missiles and produced over thirty new SSBNs so that they now deploy
seventy modern ships of this type;42 and
-developed a prototype of a new Soviet long-range bomber air36.
37.

See N.Y. Times, Apr. 30, 1982, at A3, col. 4.
See COMMITTEE ON THE PRESENT DANGER, HAS AMERICA BECOME NUMBER 2? THE

MILITARY BALANCE AND AMERICAN DEFENSE POLICIES AND PROGRAMS 7
(1982).
38. See Address by Alexander M. Haig, Jr., U.S. Secretary of State, to the Center for
Strategic and International Studies of Georgetown University (April 6, 1982), reprinted
in N.Y. Times, Apr. 7, 1982, at A8, col. 1. Secretary of State Haig declared,
In the last ten years the Soviets introduced an unprecedented array of new strategic and intermediate range systems into their arsenals, including the SS-17,
SS-18, and SS-19 ICBMs, the Backfire bomber, the Typhoon submarine and
several new types of submarine-launched missiles and the SS-20 intermediate
range missile. In contrast during this same period, the U.S. exercised restraint,
introducing only the Trident missile and submarine and the slower, air-breathing cruise missile.
Id. at 1. See also SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS, NUCLEAR WEAPONS 214
(1980) (a list of Russian armaments deployed since 1970) [hereinafter cited as NUCLEAR
U.S.-SOVIET

WEAPONS].

ON THE PRESENT DANGER, supra note 35, at 40.
40. NUCLEAR WEAPONS, supra note 38, at 216.
41. R. BERMAN & J. BAKER, SOVIET STRATEGIC FORCES: REQUIREMENTS
145 (1982).
42. Id. at 109.

39. COMMITTEE

AND RESPONSES
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craft, which appeared at an airfield near Moscow in late 1981. It has a
variable geometry swept wing, and is similar to and longer than the
United States B-1 bomber. Preliminary assessment indicates the new
bomber will be one of the heaviest bombers in the world. It will likely
carry both nuclear and conventional armament, including cruise
missiles.43
The Soviets now lead in most significant measures of overall strategic capability. The United States retains a lead in total warheads.
That relatively small advantage is reversed in terms of ballistic missile
warheads, and it rests essentially on an aging bomber force whose ability to survive an attack and penetrate Soviet air defenses is increasingly in question. Soviet nuclear offensive capability now greatly exceeds our most pessimistic forecasts of fifteen years ago.
According to the Reagan administration, the Carter defense program did not go far enough to meet the Soviet threat to our deterrent
force. Although the Reagan administration agreed with the basic thrust
of the strategic doctrine that had evolved over the past twenty years, it
felt that the trends in the strategic situation called for more drastic
action. The United States strategic triad had been neglected too long.
On October 2, 1981, President Reagan announced a far-reaching
program to modernize United States strategic forces. His modernization program is the most comprehensive one in many years, involving
all three components of the triad in addition to improving other elements of our strategic deterrent. President Reagan said:
This program will achieve three objectives: It will act as a deterrent against any Soviet actions directed against the American people or our allies. It will provide us with the capability to
respond, at reasonable cost and within adequate time, to any
further growth in Soviet forces. It will signal our resolve to
maintain the strategic balance-and this is the keystone to any
genuine arms reduction agreement with the Soviets."
The President's modernization plan includes:
(1) deployment of the MX missile in a survivable basing mode as
soon as possible. The MX will possess sufficient accuracy and power to
counter the Soviet monopoly in large, accurate ICBMs and hold at risk
the full range of Soviet assets. It will also bolster deterrence by eroding
Soviet confidence in their ability to successfully conduct a first-strike
against the United States.
43. This aircraft is the backfire bomber. See supra note 38.
44. Transcript of Remarks by the President on Weapons Programs, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 3, 1981, at A12, col. 1.
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(2) procurement of 100 B-1 bombers to replace the aging B-52
bombers which will soon no longer be able to penetrate Soviet airspace.
The B-1 will be able to penetrate Soviet air defense far into the 1990's
and provide an effective, survivable cruise missile carrier for the next
century. Once the ATB is deployed in the 1990's, it should be able to
penetrate Soviet airspace well into the next century.
(3) continued development of the Trident II (D-5) submarinelaunched ballistic missile, continued procurement of Trident submarines and deployment of nuclear armed, sea-launched cruise missiles as
a secure reserve force. Acquisition of the D-5 missile will provide improved capability to partially offset the Soviet advantage in prompt,
hard target kill capability. It will be able to place at risk a wide range
of Soviet hard targets, such as missile silos and command centers. The
increased range of the D-5 will help insure survivability of our submarines, thus contributing to strategic stability.
(4) deployment of a more survivable and enduring command, control and communication (03) system. President Reagan's decision to
modernize the strategic forces gives highest priority to the correction of
existing deficiencies in the strategic C3 system. The modernization
program for the system supports balanced improvements in essential
capabilities, including the upgrading of the survivability and endurance of the alert warning and attack assessment sensors, increased mobility and endurance of command decision-making functions and extensive improvements in communications. It further addresses the task
of assuring means for recovery and reconstitution of the strategic
forces following a major nuclear attack on the United States."
With these programs, the Reagan administration will finally implement a strategy that has been evolving since the early 1960's. Our
strategic deterrent will no longer ring hollow; instead, we will have
both the forces and the plans to deter aggression credibly along a
broad range of contingencies. A President will no longer be faced with
either suicide or surrender as his only nuclear response to aggression.
Although this modernization program is not designed to achieve
nuclear superiority for the United States, every effort is being made to
ensure that the Soviets have no incentive to initiate a nuclear attack
on the United States or our allies. For moral, political and military
reasons, civilian populations are avoided to the extent possible. This
requires that we have the capability to hold at risk those things that
the Soviet leadership values most highly-military and political control, nuclear and conventional military assets and the industrial capability to sustain war. We are determined to have the flexibility in
45.

See id.
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forces and planning necessary under all conditions of war initiation to
withstand a Soviet first-strike and retaliate in a way that permits the
United States to achieve its objectives. It must be made clear to the
Soviets, who have developed armaments and a military doctrine
designed to support limited war options, that no conceivable conflict
scenario, full-scale or limited, could result in the realization of their
political objectives. This has been the objective of United States strategic planning since the early 1960's, and it is ours today. The Reagan
administration is committed to attaining this objective.
ARMS CONTROL

The Reagan administration's arms control program plays a very
important role in both supporting the evolved strategy and enhancing
deterrence. We have learned much from our arms control experience
during the 1970's and have taken full advantage of this experience in
formulating our arms control policy. If we are successful in reaching
our arms control goals, our nuclear deterrent can only be enhanced, the
risk of war reduced and the nuclear balance maintained at equal but
much lower levels of nuclear force. This lower level of force would then
deny the Soviet Union the capacity for nuclear blackmail based on
their superiority in ground-based intermediate and intercontinental
range ballistic missiles.
As it was in the SALT process in the 1970's, the goal of the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) is to correct the asymmetry in
Soviet heavy missiles that has threatened our ICBMs for a decade."
Unlike SALT, however, START is looking to make this correction
through deep cuts in the nuclear arsenals of both sides rather than
through limitations that just cap them at higher levels. These cuts
should eliminate most of the threat posed by Soviet heavy missiles, as
the Soviet throw-weight advantage should, consequently, be greatly
reduced.
The United States has proposed that ballistic missile warheads,
both land-and sea-based, be reduced to equal levels of about 5,000, at
least one-third below current numbers.4" This would reverse the destabilizing growth in ballistic missile warheads. We propose that no more
than half these warheads be deployed on land based missiles.48 This
proposal alone should achieve substantial reductions in missile throwweight. We also seek to cut the total number of all strategic ballistic
missiles to an equal level of approximately 850, about one-half the cur46.
47.
48.
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rent United States number."9 In the second phase of the START negotiations, closely linked to the first, we will seek equal ceilings on other
elements of United States and Soviet strategic forces, including equal
limits on ballistic missile throw-weight at less than current United
States levels.
In both phases of the START talks, we have insisted, and will continue to insist on verification measures capable of assuring compliance.
In the case of provisions that cannot be monitored effectively by national, technical means of verification, we will propose cooperative
measures, data exchanges and collateral constraints that can provide
the necessary confidence in compliance. The Soviet Union has already
told us, and Mr. Brezhnev said publicly, that it will accept reasonable
verification procedures of this kind to supplement national, technical
means of verification.5 0 It is essential that the Soviets follow through
with this commitment.
Another important arms negotiation based in Geneva is the Intermediate-range Nuclear Force (INF) talks. In these talks the United
States is seeking to right an assymetry in the nuclear balance by eliminating an entire class of long-range missiles from the arsenals of both
sides.5 1 The West does not currently deploy any missile in Europe with
the range, accuracy or mobility of the most dangerous, intermediaterange Soviet missile, the SS-20. In 1979 NATO agreed to deploy 572
Pershing II and ground-based cruise missiles in Europe to counter the
threat posed by the SS-20.52 The United States has proposed to forego
deployment of these Pershing II missiles and GLCMs in Europe in return for the destruction of 80 Soviet SS-4s and SS-5s and the 324 SS20 missiles currently targeted on Europe.
The Soviet lead in ground-based, intermediate-range and intercontinental ballistic missiles is one of the most serious security problems
we and our allies face. This advantage gives the Soviet Union the potential to pose a significant threat to our European and Asian allies as
well as to friends in other parts of the world, at a time when a preemptive first-strike with its intercontinental ballistic missiles could, in the49.
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ory, destroy our entire ICBM force, the portion of our submarines that
are in port at the time of the attack and those of our bombers that are
at their bases. It is through our strategic modernization program and
arms control talks that we hope to counter this threat.
There are a number of other important issues separating the two
sides in both the INF and START talks. Much progress, however, has
been achieved by the two sides in sorting out what is important to each
and illuminating the way to possible solutions. A serious and businesslike atmosphere has evolved in the talks, and, as these talks continue,
we hope for further progress. If we yield in the end and settle for INF
and START agreements which allow the Soviet Union to preserve its
overwhelming advantage in ballistic missiles, we could find ourselves
confronting former President Nixon's bleak prognosis about "Mutual
Assured Destruction.""3 Such an outcome would legitimize the superiority in intermediate-range and intercontinental ground-based ballistic
missiles that the Soviet Union has attained under SALT and authorize
it to consolidate and better that advantage. On that basis the Soviet
leaders would be justified in continuing to believe that they could
translate their nuclear edge over the United States into political and
diplomatic hegemony.
This would be a most dangerous illusion-the kind of illusion from
which major wars have arisen in the past. President Reagan's approach
to INF and START calls on the Soviet Union to join us in recognizing
that the quest for hegemony can greatly threaten the peace and that
real nuclear parity between the Soviet Union and the United States is
the most feasible foundation for a joint program to establish nuclear
stability based on the rule of law.
The Soviet race for nuclear supremacy during the last ten years
has raised doubts about the continued effectiveness of the American
nuclear deterrent-the rock upon which the renaissance of the West
after the destruction of World War II was built and the foundation for
its security. Uncertainties on this basic point could lead to fatal miscalculations. A most important goal of our foreign policy as a whole, and
thus of our nuclear weapons and arms control policy, is to restore full
confidence in those guarantees on the part of friend and adversary
alike. It is the firm intention of this Administration to build on the
foundations established by Administrations of the past to ensure that
these guarantees never falter.
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